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Abstract
This paper proposes a general method to validate the ﬁrst-order approach for moral
hazard problems with hidden saving. I show that strong convexity assumptions both on
the agent’s marginal utility of consumption and the distribution function of output arise
naturally in this context. The ﬁrst-order approach is valid given nonincreasing absolute
risk aversion (NIARA) utility and log-convex distribution functions (LCDF) with monotone
likelihood ratios (MLR). In a second step, I relax the LCDF condition by restricting the
class of preferences and by imposing more structure on optimal wage schemes.
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11 Introduction
The study of moral hazard problems is enormously simpliﬁed if one can use the ﬁrst-order
approach. By replacing the incentive constraint with the associated ﬁrst-order condition, this
approach allows the application of Lagrangian methods. The seminal works of Rogerson (1985)
and Jewitt (1988) validate this procedure for the standard moral hazard problem. Very little is
known, however, for more general moral hazard problems. In particular, the validity of the ﬁrst-
order approach is not well understood for models in which the agent can secretly save (and bor-
row). This class of problems is rather important, since observability of the consumption-saving
decision appears to be unrealistic for many interesting applications (employment relationships,
insurance problems, taxation, etc).
As Kocherlakota (2004) points out, the validity of the ﬁrst-order approach is signiﬁcantly
more complex in the presence of hidden saving.1 In addition to making sure that the agent’s
utility is at a global maximum with respect to the eﬀort decision, one has to show the same
for the saving decision, and most importantly for joint deviations to diﬀerent eﬀort and saving
levels. Typically, the agent will combine a reduction of eﬀort with an increased savings level to
insure against the worsened output distribution. Therefore, ruling out joint deviations is the
main diﬃculty in proving that ﬁrst-order conditions are suﬃcient.
The present paper shows that conditions for the validity of the ﬁrst-order approach can be
derived quite easily nevertheless. The basic argument is simple. Suppose that output can take
only two values. Then the agent’s expected future consumption utility, depending on his choice
of eﬀort e and saving s, takes the form
p(e)u(cH + s) + (1 − p(e))u(cL + s), (1)
where p(e) is the probability of the high output, and ci, i = H,L, is the output-contingent
transfer. To establish concavity of this expression, it is useful to rewrite expected utility as
− (1 − p(e))(u(cH + s) − u(cL + s)) + u(cH + s). (2)
1Kocherlakota (2004) provides an example in which the ﬁrst-order approach to moral hazard with hidden
saving fails even though the MLR and CDF conditions from Rogerson (1985) are satisﬁed. A similar argument
shows that the conditions from Jewitt (1988) are also not suﬃcient for the problem with hidden saving.
2Only the ﬁrst summand is a joint function of eﬀort and saving, therefore this term is crucial.
Because of the minus sign, we want to establish convexity of
(1 − p(e))(u(cH + s) − u(cL + s)). (3)
The ﬁrst factor, (1 − p(e)), is the distribution function of output, evaluated at the low output
level. The second factor, (u(cH + s) − u(cL + s)), is closely related to the ﬁrst derivative of the
agent’s utility function. Hence, to validate the ﬁrst-order approach, we need suitable convex-
ity properties of both the distribution function of output and the agent’s marginal utility of
consumption.
This reasoning extends to arbitrary output spaces and yields the following main conclu-
sion: The ﬁrst-order approach is valid if a) the agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion
(NIARA) utility and b) the output technology has monotone likelihood ratios (MLR) and
a log-convex distribution function (LCDF).2 Note that LCDF requires more convexity than
Rogerson’s (1985) CDF condition and means that the (stochastic) returns to eﬀort are strongly
decreasing. In addition, NIARA makes sure that the agent’s marginal utility of consumption is
suﬃciently convex.
In a second step, this paper explores how to relax the LCDF condition. One approach is
to impose more convexity on the agent’s marginal utility of consumption. A second approach
is to impose more structure on the wage scheme, similar to the contribution by Jewitt (1988).
As a key assumption, we need log-convexity of the primitive of the distribution function then.
Even though this property is satisﬁed for some interesting examples in which LCDF fails, it
is still relatively strong. For the standard moral hazard problem, by contrast, one only needs
convexity (rather than log-convexity) of the primitive of the distribution function (Jewitt 1988,
Condition 2.10a). That condition is more pleasing, since it is valid for all production functions
with nonincreasing marginal returns to eﬀort in each state of nature. On the other hand, of
course, it is not surprising that the conditions derived in the present setup are more restrictive,
given that hidden saving fundamentally challenges the ﬁrst-order approach.
Previously, the ﬁrst-order approach to moral hazard problems with hidden saving has only
2A function is called log-convex if the logarithm of that function is convex. Any log-convex functions is convex,
but not vice versa.
3been examined under additional restrictions to the output technology or the agent’s prefer-
ences. The pioneering work by Abraham and Pavoni (2009) imposes the spanning condition
from Grossman and Hart (1983), whereas the paper by Koehne (2009) studies CARA utility.
However, neither restriction is needed. In fact, neither restriction is particularly helpful, since
the present ﬁndings contain the results by Abraham and Pavoni (2009) and Koehne (2009) as
special cases. Moreover, the present ﬁndings point out what really drives the validity of the
ﬁrst-order approach: the combined degree of convexity of the distribution function and of the
agent’s marginal utility of consumption.
The ﬁrst-order approach produces a very useful characterization of optimal contracts. Ques-
tions on the monotonicity of consumption or the value of information can be answered imme-
diately, and one ﬁnds many analogies to the model without hidden saving. One also ﬁnds
important diﬀerences between the two models as Abraham and Pavoni (2009) describe in de-
tail. In particular, they show that hidden saving tends to make optimal contracts more convex.
This implies that the associated tax-transfer scheme is typically more regressive than in the
standard setup.
The ﬁrst-order approach is also important because it gives the multi-period problem a
tractable recursive structure, as discussed by Werning (2001, 2002), Kocherlakota (2004), and
Abraham and Pavoni (2008), among others. Analytical results for the validity of the ﬁrst-order
approach provide a theoretical foundation for this procedure. The present paper is just a ﬁrst
step, however, because the generalization from two periods to the multi-period case is not trivial.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3 validates
the ﬁrst-order approach given NIARA, MLR and LCDF. Section 4 shows how to relax the latter
assumption. Section 5 collects all proofs. Section 6 concludes.
2 Setup
I study a two-period principal-agent problem. In the ﬁrst period, the agent makes a hidden
saving decision. In the second period, the agent exerts a hidden work eﬀort. Contracts are
signed at the beginning of the ﬁrst period and there is no renegotiation. To make the proofs
a bit less cumbersome, I suppose that the distribution of output is absolutely continuous. All
results go through for discrete output spaces as well.
42.1 Preferences
The Principal (P) maximizes expected proﬁts. For simplicity, P’s discount factor equals 1. The
Agent (A) has von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and maximizes the expected value of
u(c1) + β (u(c2) − v(e)),
where ct denotes consumption and e represents eﬀort. Consumption utility u is twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes u′ > 0, u′′ < 0. Eﬀort disutility v is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes v′ > 0, v′′ ≥ 0.
2.2 Technology
In the ﬁrst period, A is endowed with w0 units of the consumption good and can save at zero
interest. Negative saving, i.e., borrowing, is allowed. The set of feasible saving choices is the real
interval J. The interval may be bounded or unbounded.3 A’s saving decision is not observable.
In the second period, A exerts an unobservable work eﬀort e ∈ I, where I is a real interval.
This generates a publicly observable stochastic output x ∈ [x,x]. The output is distributed
according to the probability density f(x,e), which is continuously diﬀerentiable and has full
support for all e ∈ I.
2.3 Contracts
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, P proposes a contract (w( ),e,s) consisting of an output-
contingent wage scheme w( ) and recommended choices (e,s). A’s utility from rejecting the
contract and saving optimally is U. The contract is called optimal if it maximizes expected
proﬁts subject to the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint, i.e., if
3The interval J may be bounded below due to a borrowing constraint and bounded above due to a nonnega-
tivity constraint.
5it solves the following problem:
max
w( ),e,s
  x
x
(x − w(x))f(x,e)dx (P1)
s.t.
(e,s) ∈ argmax
(e′,s′)∈I×J
u(w0 − s′) + β
  x
x
u(w(x) + s′)f(x,e′)dx − βv(e′) (IC)
u(w0 − s) + β
  x
x
u(w(x) + s)f(x,e)dx − βv(e) ≥ U (PC)
2.4 First-order approach
Problem (P1) is extremely intricate. The incentive constraint (IC) consists of a two-dimensional
continuum of inequalities. For all e′ ∈ I,s′ ∈ R, it requires
u(w0 − s) + β
  x
x
u(w(x) + s)f(x,e)dx − βv(e)
≥ u(w0 − s′) + β
  x
x
u(w(x) + s′)f(x,e′)dx − βv(e′).
(4)
To obtain a problem that can be solved by standard methods, one replaces the incentive con-
straint by the agent’s ﬁrst-order necessary conditions. This gives rise to the following problem:
max
w( ),e,s
  x
x
(x − w(x))f(x,e)dx (P2)
s.t.
β
  x
x
u(w(x) + s)fe(x,e)dx − βv′(e) = 0 (FOCe)
u′(w0 − s) − β
  x
x
u′(w(x) + s)f(x,e)dx = 0 (FOCs)
u(w0 − s) + β
  x
x
u(w(x) + s)f(x,e)dx − βv(e) ≥ U (PC)
Solutions to (P2) are denoted by (w∗( ),e∗,s∗). The associated consumption levels are denoted
by c∗
0 = w∗
0 − s∗ and c∗(x) = w∗(x) + s∗.
Replacing the true problem (P1) by the ﬁrst-order problem (P2) is a valid procedure only if
their solutions coincide. Assuming that the solutions to (P1) are interior with respect to eﬀort
and saving, this will be the case if and only if the contracts solving (P2) are incentive compatible.
6A suﬃcient condition for incentive compatibility is that the agent’s decision problem is concave
at these contracts. The remainder of this paper will identify conditions under which this is the
case.
3 A suﬃcient condition for concavity of the agent’s problem
In this section, I validate the ﬁrst-order approach using nonincreasing absolute risk aversion,
monotonicity of the wage scheme, and an assumption on the curvature of the output distribution
function. This procedure strengthens the classic approach of Mirrlees (1979) and Rogerson
(1985).
Using λ,  and ξ as the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (PC), (FOCe),
(FOCs), respectively, the ﬁrst-order condition of the Lagrangian of problem (P2) with respect
to wages is
0 = −f(x,e∗) +  βu′(c∗(x))fe(x,e∗) − ξβu′′(c∗(x))f(x,e∗) + λβu′(c∗(x))f(x,e∗), x ∈ [x,x].
(5)
Equivalently,
1
βu′(c∗(x))
= λ +  
fe(x,e∗)
f(x,e∗)
+ ξα(c∗(x)), x ∈ [x,x], (6)
where α(c) = −u′′(c)/u′(c) is A’s coeﬃcient of absolute risk-aversion.
Expression (6) equates the principal’s costs and beneﬁts of marginally increasing the agent’s
utility at output x, normalized by the probability density (Abraham and Pavoni 2009). Com-
pared to the standard moral hazard problem, there is now the additional term ξα(c∗(x)), because
an increase of u(c∗(x)) relaxes the agent’s Euler equation.4
I will often use the following two assumptions to give equation (6) more structure.
MLR. The likelihood ratio function, fe(x,e)/f(x,e), is continuously diﬀerentiable and nonde-
creasing in output x for all eﬀort levels e.
4Note that an increase of βu(c
∗(x)) by one marginal unit costs the principal 1/(βu
′(c
∗(x))) units of consump-
tion. On the other hand, it generates a beneﬁt of λ because the participation constraint is relaxed and a beneﬁt
(or cost) of µfe/f because the incentive constraint is relaxed (or tightened). In addition, there is a beneﬁt of
ξα(c
∗(x)) because an increase of βu(c
∗(x)) mitigates the agent’s wish to save (Abraham and Pavoni 2009).
7NIARA. The agent’s coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, α(c) = −u′′(c)/u′(c), is continuously
diﬀerentiable and nonincreasing in consumption c.
MLR is standard and simply means that more output is indicative of higher eﬀort. NIARA
implies that the multipliers λ, ,ξ in the Kuhn-Tucker condition (6) are positive: λ > 0,   > 0,
ξ > 0 (Abraham and Pavoni 2009). Moreover, MLR plus NIARA is suﬃcient for A’s consump-
tion scheme c∗(x) = w∗(x) + s∗ to be continuously diﬀerentiable and nondecreasing in output
x; see equation (6).5
As noted before, the ﬁrst-order approach is valid if A’s objective function
(e,s)  → u(c∗
0 − s) + β
  x
x
u(c∗(x) + s)f(x,e)dx − βv(e) (7)
is concave in (e,s) at the contracts that solve (P2). One can restrict attention to A’s second-
period consumption utility as the next result shows.
Lemma 1. A’s decision problem is concave in (e,s) if A’s second-period consumption utility
(e,s)  →
  x
x
u(c∗(x) + s)f(x,e)dx (8)
is concave in (e,s).
By focusing on A’s second-period consumption utility, I ignore the curvature generated by
the eﬀort disutility function and by the eﬀect of saving on ﬁrst-period utility. In principle,
one could obtain more general results by including these two eﬀects. However, these terms
substantially reduce the tractability of the problem. Besides, the role of the eﬀort disutility
function is limited anyway, since eﬀort units can always be normalized such that this function
is linear.
The following lemma identiﬁes a suﬃcient condition for concavity of (8).
Lemma 2. Suppose c∗( ) is continuously diﬀerentiable and nondecreasing. Suppose the dis-
tribution function of output, F(x,e), is convex in e and for all x ∈ [x,x], e ∈ I, s ∈ J, we
have
Fee(x,e)F(x,e)
(Fe(x,e))2
u′′′(c∗(x) + s)u′(c∗(x) + s)
(u′′(c∗(x) + s))2 ≥ 1. (9)
5NIARA can be relaxed. Equation (6) implies that c
∗(·) is nondecreasing under MLR if −(u
′′′u
′ − (u
′′)
2) ≤
−u
′′(βξ)
−1. This requires that the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion does not increase too quickly.
8Then A’s second-period consumption utility is concave in (e,s).
To understand condition (9), note that FeeF/(Fe)2 is nonnegative if and only if F is convex
in e, and at least 1 if and only F is log-convex in e.6 Hence, FeeF/(Fe)2 measures the convexity
of the distribution function F as a function eﬀort. This motivates the following concept.
LCDF. The distribution function of output, F(x,e), is log-convex in eﬀort e for all output
levels x.
A necessary but not suﬃcient condition for LCDF is that the distribution function is convex
in eﬀort. Hence, LCDF tightens the CDF condition from Mirrlees (1979) and Rogerson (1985).
To interpret LCDF, note that F(x′,e) equals 1 − P(x > x′|e). Therefore, stating that
F(x′,e) is log-convex in eﬀort (or highly convex, in other words) implies that the probability
P(x > x′|e) is highly concave in eﬀort. For this reason, LCDF requires that the (stochastic)
returns to eﬀort are strongly decreasing: The probability P(x > x′|e) that output is larger than
some level x′ is highly concave in the agent’s eﬀort choice e for all values of x′.
Analogous to the interpretation of FeeF/(Fe)2, note that u′′′u′/(u′′)2 is a measure of con-
vexity of A’s marginal utility of consumption. This measure is nonnegative if and only if u′ is
convex, and at least 1 if and only if u′ is log-convex. Convexity of u′ is typically referred to as
nonnegative prudence. Log-convexity of u′ is equivalent to
u′′′u′ − (u′′)2
(u′)2 ≥ 0. (10)
This is the case if and only if
d
dc
 
−
u′′(c)
u′(c)
 
≤ 0. (11)
Hence, log-convexity of u′ is equivalent to NIARA.
The main result is a now direct consequence of these observations: MLR, NIARA and LCDF
validate the ﬁrst-order approach.
Theorem 1. Let (w∗( ),e∗,s∗) be a solution to (P2). Suppose MLR, NIARA and LCDF.
Then, given this contract, the agent’s decision problem is concave in eﬀort and saving. Hence,
the contract is also a solution to (P1).
6A function is called log-convex if the logarithm of that function is convex. Any log-convex functions is convex,
but not vice versa.
9While NIARA is not too problematic, LCDF is novel. Therefore some examples might be
helpful.
Example 1 (Rogerson 1985). Rogerson’s paper contains the following distribution function
that is convex in eﬀort and satisﬁes MLR:
F(x,e) =
 x
x
 e−e
, x ∈ [0,x], e ∈ (e,∞). (12)
This distribution function is not only convex in e, but even satisﬁes LCDF. Note
log(F(x,e)) = (e − e)log
 x
x
 
, (13)
which shows that F(x,e) is log-linear in e for all i.
Example 2 (Log-logistic distribution). Let 0 < β ≤ 1. Consider the following distribution
function:
F(x,e) =
1
1 + (e/x)
β, x ∈ [0,∞), e ∈ (0,∞). (14)
It is not diﬃcult to see that MLR is satisﬁed. Moreover, note
log(F(x,e)) = −log
 
1 + (e/x)
β
 
. (15)
Since β ≤ 1, the expression (e/x)β is concave in e. Since the logarithm is increasing and concave,
equation (15) shows that log(F(x,e)) is convex in e. Thus, LCDF is satisﬁed.
The following examples apply to discrete output spaces X = {x1,...,xn}, xi < xj for i < j.
In this setup, wages are vectors (w1,...,wn) ∈ Rn, and probability weights (p1(e),...,pn(e))
replace the density function f(x,e). The previous results extend to the discrete setup without
diﬃculty.
Example 3 (Two outputs). Consider the case with two possible outputs, xL < xH, and
associated probabilities pL(e) = 1 − p(e), pH(e) = p(e), for some increasing function p with
0 ≤ p(e) ≤ 1. Since p is increasing, MLR is satisﬁed. LCDF is equivalent to the log-convexity
of 1 − p(e). One example that satisﬁes this condition is the function p(e) = 1 − exp(−f(e)),
where f : I → (0,∞) is increasing and concave.
10Example 4 (Spanning condition). Let (π1h,...,πnh), (π1l,...,πnl) be two probability distri-
butions on {x1,...,xn} such that πih/πil is nondecreasing in i. (This implies that πh ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates πl.) Let
pi(e) = Γ(e)πih + (1 − Γ(e))πil (16)
for some increasing function Γ, with 0 ≤ Γ(e) ≤ 1. Monotonicity of Γ, combined with the fact
that πih/πil is nondecreasing, yields MLR. Note
Fi(e) = F(xi,e) =
i  
j=1
pj(e) = (1 − Γ(e))
i  
j=1
(πil − πih) +
i  
j=1
πih. (17)
First-order stochastic dominance implies
 i
j=1(πil−πih) ≥ 0. Therefore, LCDF holds if 1−Γ(e)
is log-convex. This requirement is equivalent to
(Γ′(e))2
−Γ′′(e)(1 − Γ(e))
≤ 1, (18)
which is exactly the condition under which Abraham and Pavoni (2009) validate the ﬁrst-order
approach for the spanning condition and NIARA utility. Their proof relies heavily on the
spanning condition and there is no obvious way how it generalizes to the setting considered in
this paper. Moreover, Abraham and Pavoni’s reading of the property in (18) is that the Frisch
elasticity of leisure must not be larger than one (Abraham and Pavoni 2009, p. 16). This does
not capture the precise sense in which (18) tightens the CDF condition from Mirrlees (1979)
and Rogerson (1985), in contrast to the interpretation oﬀered here.
4 How to relax LCDF
The previous section has relied on a relatively strong assumption regarding the curvature of
the output technology. I now explore three ways of relaxing that assumption. The ﬁrst method
restricts the class of preferences. Methods 2 and 3 use the shape of the wage scheme in more
detail. Diﬀerent from the ﬁrst method, the obtained conditions are less easily translated into
assumptions on exogenous variables. However, they are simple to check in practice.
114.1 DARA instead of NIARA
Recall that LCDF is equivalent to FeeF/(Fe)2 ≥ 1, while NIARA is equivalent to u′′′u′/(u′′)2 ≥
1. If the latter expression is bounded away from 1, then Lemma 2 can be used to relax LCDF.
This yields the following result.
Proposition 3. Let (w∗( ),e∗,s∗) be a solution to (P2). Suppose MLR and NIARA. Suppose
there exists a number η > 1 such that for all c
u′′′(c)u′(c)
(u′′(c))2 ≥ η, (19)
and for all e ∈ I, x ∈ [x,x],
Fee(x,e)F(x,e)
(Fe(x,e))2 ≥
1
η
. (20)
Then, given this contract, the agent’s decision problem is concave in eﬀort and saving.
Note that (19) implies that the agent’s preferences satisfy DARA: The coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion, α(c) = −u′′(c)/u′(c), is decreasing in consumption c. Moreover, note that (20)
implies that Fee(x,e) is nonnegative. Hence, while (20) is weaker than LCDF, it still requires
that the distribution function is convex in eﬀort.
As an important example, consider CRRA utility: u(c) = c1−γ/(1 − γ). Then we have
u′′′(c)u′(c)
(u′′(c))2 = 1 +
1
γ
. (21)
Hence, using Proposition 3, we conclude that the ﬁrst-order approach is valid if for all e ∈ I,
x ∈ [x,x],
Fee(x,e)F(x,e)
(Fe(x,e))2 ≥
γ
1 + γ
. (22)
Under the spanning condition from Example 4, for instance, this property is equivalent to
(Γ′(e))2
−Γ′′(e)(1 − Γ(e))
≤ 1 +
1
γ
for all e ∈ I. (23)
This relaxes condition (18).
124.2 Concave wage schemes
Proposition 4. Let (w∗( ),e∗,s∗) be a solution to (P2). Suppose w∗(x) is nondecreasing con-
cave in output x. Suppose the distribution function of output, F(x,e), is quasiconvex in (x,e).
Then, given this contract, the agent’s decision problem is concave in eﬀort and saving.
At ﬁrst glance, Proposition 4 seems to suggest that the validity of the ﬁrst-order approach
is not aﬀected by the introduction of hidden saving. Indeed, the result does not need any extra
assumptions compared to the standard setup. However, there is a crucial diﬀerence between the
two cases: The assumption of a concave wage scheme is relatively mild in the standard model,
but much more restrictive in the present setting.
To see why, recall from the Kuhn-Tucker condition (6) that solutions to (P2) are character-
ized by
w∗(x) + s∗ = g−1
 
λ +  
fe(x,e∗)
f(x,e∗)
 
, (24)
with g(c) = 1/(βu′(c)) − ξα(c). The following result argues that, given ξ > 0, the function g−1
is typically not concave. Thus, in the present setting, concave wage schemes are not guaranteed
under the common assumption that the likelihood ratio function fe(x,e)/f(x,e) is concave in
output x.
Consider utility functions of the HARA class,
u(c) = ζ
 
η +
c
γ
 1−γ
, η +
c
γ
> 0, (25)
with ζ(1 − γ)/γ > 0 and γ > 0.7 Special members of this class are CRRA utility (η = 0) and
CARA utility (γ → ∞).
Lemma 5. Suppose utility is of the class deﬁned in (25). For ξ = 0 (no hidden saving), the
function g−1 is concave if and only if γ ≥ 1. For ξ > 0 (hidden saving), the function g−1 is
concave if and only if utility is CARA.
7Condition ζ(1 − γ)/γ > 0 ensures that u is increasing and concave; condition γ > 0 ensures NIARA.
134.3 Using the primitive of the distribution function
The assumption that wages are concave in output is relatively strong as the previous subsection
has shown. The present subsection relaxes LCDF under a condition that is somewhat weaker.
To simplify the argument, I suppose that the wage scheme is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
in output.8
Given a mild assumption on the agent’s preferences, concavity of the wage scheme is stronger
than the following property.
Lemma 6. Suppose NIARA and suppose −u′′′(c)/u′′(c) is nonincreasing in c. Then the condi-
tion
−
d2(u(c∗(x) + s))
dx2 is log-convex in saving s (LCS)
is necessary but not suﬃcient for w∗(x) to be concave in output x.
The assumption that −u′′′(c)/u′′(c) is nonincreasing in c (nonincreasing absolute prudence)
is innocuous. For instance, it is satisﬁed for all utility functions of the class deﬁned in (25).
The property identiﬁed in Lemma 6 yields the following result.
Proposition 7. Let (w∗( ),e∗,s∗) be a solution to (P2). Suppose MLR and NIARA. Suppose
that for all output levels x
−
d2(u(c∗(x) + s))
dx2 is log-convex in saving s, (LCS)
  F(x,e) =
  x
x
F(z,e)dz is log-convex in eﬀort e. (LCP)
Then, given this contract, the agent’s decision problem is concave in eﬀort and saving.
Note that log-convexity is preserved under integration (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004,
p. 106). Therefore, log-convexity of the primitive, LCP, is a weaker assumption than log-
convexity of the distribution function, LCDF. Intuitively, the primitive   F(x,e) will be log-
convex in e if the distribution function F(x,e) is log-convex in e for small values of x and “not
too misbehaved” for large values of x. In fact, F(x,e) does not even have to be convex in e as
the following example shows.
8As the Kuhn-Tucker condition (6) shows, the wage scheme w
∗(x) = c
∗(x)−s
∗ will be C
2 in x if fe(x,e)/f(x,e)
is C
2 in x and u
′(c),α(c) are C
2 in c.
14Example 5 (Beta Prime distribution). Consider the Beta Prime distribution with parameter
b = 2:
f(x,e) =
xe−1(1 + x)−e−2
B(e,2)
, x ∈ [0,∞), e ∈ (0,∞), (26)
where B(e,b) represents the Beta function. The likelihood ratio function fe(x,e)/f(x,e) is
nondecreasing concave in x, hence the class of preferences satisfying LCS is nonempty. The
distribution function is
F(x,e) = (1 + e + x)xe(1 + x)−e−1. (27)
It is easy to see that F(x,e) is not convex in e for all x. However, the primitive of the distribution
function,
  F(x,e) = x
 
x
1 + x
 e
, (28)
is log-linear in e. Therefore, LCP is satisﬁed.
5 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. A’s objective function is
(e,s)  → u(c∗
0 − s) + β
  x
x
u(c∗(x) + s)f(x,e)dx − βv(e). (29)
Since u is concave, the ﬁrst summand is concave in (e,s). Since v is convex, the third summand
is concave in (e,s).
Proof of Lemma 2. Using partial integration, A’s second-period consumption utility can be
rewritten as
  x
x
u(c∗(x) + s)f(x,e)dx = u(c∗(x) + s) −
  x
x
(c∗)′(x)u′(c∗(x) + s)F(x,e)dx. (30)
Hence, A’s second-period consumption utility is concave in (e,s) if the function
(e,s)  → −
  x
x
(c∗)′(x)u′(c∗(x) + s)F(x,e)dx (31)
15is concave, or equivalently if the function
(e,s)  →
  x
x
(c∗)′(x)u′(c∗(x) + s)F(x,e)dx (32)
is convex. We want to show that
g(e,s;x) = u′(c∗(x) + s)F(x,e) (33)
is convex in (e,s) for all x. Since (c∗)′(x) ≥ 0 by assumption, and since convexity is preserved
under integration, this will imply convexity of (32).
The function g(e,s;x) is convex in (e,s) if and only if its Hessian has a nonnegative diagonal
and a nonnegative determinant. Omitting all arguments, the Hessian equals
H =



Feeu′ Feu′′
Feu′′ Fu′′′


. (34)
The ﬁrst diagonal entry is nonnegative by assumption. Condition (9) is equivalent to the
statement that the determinant of H is nonnegative. In that case, the second diagonal entry of
H must also be nonnegative.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 1, it is suﬃcient to establish concavity of A’s second-period
consumption utility. Due to MLR and NIARA, the Kuhn-Tucker condition (6) implies that
consumption c∗(x) is continuously diﬀerentiable and nondecreasing in output x. Moreover,
LCDF and NIARA imply that condition (9) from Lemma 2 is satisﬁed. Hence, A’s second-
period consumption utility is concave.
Proof of Proposition 3. Direct consequence of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma 1, it is suﬃcient to consider A’s second-period consumption
utility. Moreover, due to quasiconvexity of the distribution function, the output technology can
be represented by a production function x = ϕ(e,ǫ), with ϕ(e,ǫ) nondecreasing concave in eﬀort
e and nondecreasing in the stochastic state of nature ǫ (Jewitt 1988, Lemma 2).
16Using this representation, we can write A’s second-period consumption utility as
  x
x
u(c∗(x) + s)f(x,e)dx = E[u(c∗(ϕ(e,ǫ)) + s)], (35)
where E[ ] denotes expectations with respect to the state of nature ǫ. Since ϕ(e,ǫ) is concave in
e and c∗(x) = w∗(x) + s∗ is nondecreasing concave in x, the composition c∗(ϕ(e,ǫ)) is concave
in e. Hence, the function c∗(ϕ(e,ǫ)) + s is concave in (e,s). Since u is nondecreasing concave,
and since concavity is preserved under integration, this completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. First of all, since g is nondecreasing, note that g−1 is concave if and only if
g is convex. If ξ = 0, then g is convex if and only if 1/u′ is convex. For HARA utility, this is
equivalent to the condition γ ≥ 1.
Now consider the case ξ > 0. Verifying concavity of g−1 for CARA is straighforward.
Suppose that utility is not CARA, i.e., suppose γ < ∞. We have
g(c) =
1
βu′(c)
− ξα(c) =
γ
βζ(1 − γ)
 
η +
c
γ
 γ
− ξ
 
η +
c
γ
 −1
. (36)
Hence, the second derivative of g equals
g′′(c) = −
1
βζ
 
η +
c
γ
 γ−2
−
2ξ
γ2
 
η +
c
γ
 −3
. (37)
This is positive if and only if
γ2
−ζβ
 
η +
c
γ
 γ+1
≥ 2ξ. (38)
The left-hand side in (38) goes to zero if η + c/γ is small. Hence, (38) does not hold for all
feasible consumption levels. In other words, g is not convex. This implies that g−1 is not
concave.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose w∗(x) is concave in x. Equivalently, c∗(x) = w∗(x)+s∗ is concave
in x. The function in (LCS) can be represented as
−
d2(u(c∗(x) + s))
dx2 =
 
−(c∗)′′(x)
 
u′(c∗(x) + s) +
 
(c∗)′(x)
 2  
−u′′(c∗(x) + s)
 
. (39)
17The ﬁrst summand in (39) is log-convex in s, since −(c∗)′′(x) ≥ 0 and since u′ is log-convex
due to NIARA. The second summand is log-convex in s, since ((c∗)′(x))2 ≥ 0 and since −u′′ is
log-convex when −u′′′/u′′ is nonincreasing. Since log-convexity is preserved under summation
(Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004, p. 105), the function in (LCS) is therefore log-convex in s.
On the other hand, suppose that the function in (LCS) is log-convex in s. As (39) shows,
this does not imply that c∗(x) or w∗(x) = c∗(x) − s∗ is concave in x in general.
Proof of Proposition 7. As Lemma 1 shows, it is suﬃcient to establish concavity of
(e,s)  →
  x
x
u(c∗(x) + s)f(x,e)dx. (40)
This is equivalent to establishing convexity of
(e,s)  → −
  x
x
u(c∗(x) + s)f(x,e)dx. (41)
Using two steps of partial integration, the latter function can be rewritten as
−u(c∗(x) + s) + (c∗)′(x)u′(c∗(x) + s))  F(x,e) +
  x
x
 
−
d2(u(c∗(x) + s))
dx2
 
  F(x,e)dx. (42)
First, note that the expression −u(c∗(x) + s) is convex in (e,s) due to the concavity of u.
Moreover, the expression
(c∗)′(x)u′(c∗(x) + s))  F(x,e) (43)
is convex in (e,s) by an argument similar to Lemma 2. For the third term in (42), note that
−
d2(u(c∗(x) + s))
dx2
  F(x,e) (44)
is the product of a function that is log-convex in s and a function that is log-convex in e.
Such products are convex in (e,s) as one easily veriﬁes. Since convexity is preserved under
integration, the third term in (42) is thus convex as well. This completes the proof.
186 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes a general method to validate the ﬁrst-order approach for moral hazard
problems with hidden saving. For this question, the key challenge is to rule out joint deviations
to lower eﬀort and higher saving levels. I use convexity assumptions on the agent’s marginal
utility of consumption and the distribution function of output to limit the gains of such devia-
tions. An important open question is how these results extend to the multi-period case. This
diﬃcult task is left for future research.
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